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Viewing cable 07BERLIN1715, GEORGIA/NATO: GERMANY HOLDS FIRM AGAINST NAC TRIP

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#07BERLIN1715**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
07BERLIN1715	2007-09-10 15:50	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Berlin

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4026862.ece>

VZCZCXYZ0007
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRL #1715 2531550
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101550Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9241
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1841
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI IMMEDIATE 0191
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 9707

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 001715
SIPDIS
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2017
TAGS: [NATO](#) [GG](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [GM](#)
SUBJECT: GEORGIA/NATO: GERMANY HOLDS FIRM AGAINST NAC TRIP
TO GEORGIA

REF: A. STATE 1125337
[1](#)B. USNATO 479

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor John K. Bauman for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Political Counselor raised Ref (A) points with MFA NATO Office Director Dirk Brengelmann and NSC-director-equivalent Detlef Waechter at the Chancellery. Their positions were essentially identical and appeared to be coordinated: Germany does not support a North Atlantic Council visit to Georgia in October. Brengelmann said September 10 that this remained Germanys position after discussions between Political Director Volker Stanzel and EUR A/S Dan Fried.

¶2. (C) Waechter and Brengelmann said the German position was firm. The reason was Russia -- it was the German interagency assessment that a NAC visit would be interpreted by the Russians as a "provocation" and that this would complicate efforts with Russia in other key areas such as the Kosovo Troika and CFE. PolCouns argued that, if possible Russian objections were the criteria, there would always be a reason for the NAC not to visit Tbilisi; Russia should not have veto power over the NACs travel schedule. Waechter said Berlin had looked at the pros and cons, and believed that a NAC trip was not as important as the Troika talks at this stage, and that the latter might be further complicated by a NAC visit to Georgia.

¶3. (C) Brengelmann asserted that the Georgians would take a NAC visit as a positive indication of Georgias prospects for gaining an early Membership Action Plan. PolCouns argued that the trip would not prejudice any Allys position on MAP. Instead, it would offer an opportunity to support positive trends in Georgia while also underscoring the importance of restraint and constructive engagement by Tbilisi. It was within the power of the NAC to ensure that the Georgians -- and the Russians -- got that message unfiltered. Brengelmann argued that NATOs ability to control the message effectively might be constrained.

¶4. (C) Comment: The German Government is demonstrating an unusual degree of interagency coordination on this matter. In Posts experience, the Chancellery is not normally so well informed on the details of NATO-related instructions. End comment.
TIMKEN JR